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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a scenario where the police arrest and charge two women with a 
string of connected robberies.1 Both women are twenty years-old and have very 
little money and no criminal record.2 Despite this lack of criminal history and 
money, the judge orders detention until trial unless each one can pay the $150, 
000 bail set by that same judge.3 Ultimately, one woman secures release from 
jail.4 She manages to reduce her charges from felony robbery to a lesser offense 
of simple theft with the possibility of dismissal within a year upon the 
completion of probation and community service.5 
The other woman, in a situation identical to the first, remains in jail.6 Under 
the taxing conditions of the jail—poor sanitation, bad food, little chance for 
recreation or fresh air—she accepts the prosecutor’s plea deal.7 While the deal 
allows her to return to her son, it also burdens her with two felony counts of 
robbery, five years of probation, and a seven-year suspended sentence—any 
misstep with the criminal justice system will send her directly to prison.8 
This disparity caused only by the ability to pay bail portrays the real-life 
experience of Daria Morrison, Sarah Jackson, and others like them.9 The first 
woman, Daria, had financial support from her family and secured release from 
jail with the help of a bail bondsmen.10 Free from pretrial detention, Daria 
defended her case with an attorney’s help, which led to the revelation that neither 
woman had actively participated in the robberies.11 This revelation led to Daria’s 
 
1.  John Raphling, California Ended Cash Bail—But May Have Replaced It with Something Worse: 
Racist Algorithms and Unlimited Judicial Discretion Threaten to Increase Pretrial Incarceration in California, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/24/california-ended-cash-bail-may-
have-replaced-it-something-even-worse (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL 
SYSTEM UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 68 (2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-
justice/how-californias-pretrial-detention-and-bail-system-unfairly (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
3.  Ralphling, supra note 1.  
4.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 2. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Ralphling, supra note 1. 
8.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 2. 
9.  See, e.g., Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law School) (“In June [2015], Sandra Bland was found dead in her cell in Texas after failing to come up with 
$500 for her release”).  
10.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 2. 
11.  Id. 
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reduced charges and allowed her to return to her waitressing job.12 She can now 
continue her hopes of becoming a lawyer.13 
Sarah, however, remained incarcerated for three months without a resolution 
of her case and finally accepted a guilty plea for a time-served sentence under 
which she could leave immediately.14 She did so because she could not afford to 
pay her $150,000 bail, which the judge set so high in part due to the prosecutor’s 
argument that she was too dangerous to release pretrial.15 Choosing a different 
option would cause Sarah to lose her job resulting in myriad collateral 
consequences—the worst of which would be separation from her child.16 
Although the deal allowed her to reunite with her son, it also left her with two 
felony counts of robbery—both of which constitute a “strike” under California’s 
“three strikes” law.17 
Sarah and Daria’s case is hardly unique.18 Many other stories demonstrate the 
life-altering impacts of pretrial detention for those who are unable to afford the 
bail amount the judge, prosecutor, or bail schedule determine is appropriate.19 
Jurisdictions across the country have experimented with bail reform since the 
1960s, but those reforms produced mixed results and occurred in scattered 
jurisdictions.20 To address the root cause of a broken bail system, California 
Governor Jerry Brown signed the Money Bail Reform Act (“SB 10”) in August 
2018, effectively ending the state’s reliance on cash bail.21 This move followed 
efforts in a number of other states to reduce their reliance on cash bail, but 
California became the first to completely foreclose its use.22 
 
12.  Ralphling, supra note 1. 
13.  Id. 
14.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 2. 
15.  Ralphling, supra note 1. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id.; THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES SENTENCING LAW 3 
(2019), available at https://www.courts.ca.gov/20142.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (“The essence of the Three Strikes law was to require a defendant convicted of any new felony, having 
suffered one prior conviction of a serious felony to be sentenced to state prison for twice the term otherwise 
provided for the crime”).  
18. See Eyder Peralta, Kalief Browder, Jailed for Years Without Trial, Kills Himself, NPR (June 2015) 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/08/412842780/kalief-browder-jailed-for-years-at-rikers-
island-without-trial-commits-suicide (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Kalief Browder, 
the young man who was held for years in a New York jail without a trial, killed himself on Saturday. . ..Because 
his family was unable to raise his $10,000 bail [for allegedly stealing a backpack], Browder languished at 
Rikers Island for three years awaiting trial”).  
19.  See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 2 (highlighting the ramifications of pretrial detention that are 
common to many detainees). 
20.  Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from Jail, 
Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-
criminal-justice-inequality (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
21.  Alexei Koseff, Jerry Brown Signs Bill Eliminating Money Bail in California, SACRAMENTO BEE 
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article217461380.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
22.  See GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 
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SB 10’s supporters hope that the law will reduce unnecessary detainments 
before trial in the state and also alleviate the harsh effects felt by the groups the 
current bail regime disproportionately victimizes.23 However, civil rights 
activists, victims’ rights advocates, and the bail industry have launched an attack 
on the law.24 Critics argue that the passage of SB 10 was too hasty and will have 
unintended consequences.25 
While the groups differ markedly on their concerns with the law, most in 
opposition can agree—albeit for different reasons—that the risk assessment 
systems (“RAS”) on which the law relies should not be the foundation of bail 
reform in California or across the nation.26 In fact, under such a system, a chance 
exists that the court would release neither Sarah or Daria.27 Instead, an RAS 
likely would have detained them pretrial without bail due to a combination of 
factors including their charge, age, and where they lived.28 
Because supporters of the bail bonds industry collected enough signatures to 
put a referendum on the 2020 ballot seeking to prevent the implementation of SB 
10, only time will tell whether the law will materialize.29 It is heartening that 
California can use other jurisdictions’ responses to the problems associated with 
cash bail as examples,30 but California’s unique political and social landscape 
will make the implementation of a system that goes farther quite difficult.31 As 
 
MISDEMEANOR BAIL REFORM AND LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW 1–10 (Sept. 2017), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d935d1e1
-80a-3314-bf2a-bbefde49285f&forceDialog=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(providing an overview of the most recent bail reform movements across the United States and the measures 
those jurisdictions have taken to reduce reliance on cash bail).  
23.  Bob Egelko, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Bill Eliminating California’s Cash-Bail System, SFGATE (Aug. 
29, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Gov-Jerry-Brown-signs-bill-eliminating-13188659.php (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
24.  Meagan Flynn, California Abolishes Money Bail With a Landmark Law. But some Reformers Think It 
Creates New Problems, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2018/08/29/c. . .reformers-think-it-creates-new-problems/?utm_term=.8d3a0ea5423c (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law School); Sheyanne Romero, Human Rights Advocates, Bail Industry Leaders 
Fight to Stop No Cash Bail Law, VISALIA TIMES DELTA (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.visaliatimesdelta.com/story/news/2018/12/28/human-rights-advocates-bail-industry-leaders-fight-
overturn-sb-10/2415570002/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
25.  Romero, supra note 24. 
26.  See generally John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the 
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. EV. 1727 (Dec. 2018) (highlighting the main underlying challenges with 
risk assessment systems leading to the conclusion that they should be hesitantly embraced).   
27.  Ralphling, supra note 1. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Jazmine Ulloa, California’s Historic Overhaul of Cash Bail is Now on Hold, Pending a 2020 
Referendum, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-overhaul-referendum-
20190116-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
30.  Youngjin Choi, Lessons From California and New Jersey Bail Reform Legislation, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 
07, 2018), https://www.law.com/neewyorklawjournal/2018/12/07/lessons-from-californa-and-new-jersey-bail-
reform-legislation/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
31.  See George Skelton, Why We Need Bail Reform: California Shouldn’t Be Requiring a Payment for 
Freedom, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-skelton-bail-reform-
20180226-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating that California has 
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such, the passage of SB 10 should be the beginning, rather than the end, of the 
conversation surrounding what works best for California in terms of bail 
reform.32 
This comment argues that regardless of a jurisdiction’s given bail method, 
the law should mandate consultation and cooperation with community-based 
organizations regarding the appropriate procedures for pretrial detention if those 
states choose to eliminate cash bail.33 Part II provides a brief background 
surrounding the history and purpose of bail and its subsequent effects.34 Part III 
then demonstrates that the signed version of SB 10 does not accomplish the goals 
of reducing flight risk and promoting public safety and fails to safeguard 
defendants’ rights.35 Part IV argues that community-based organizations are 
essential to garner substantive change with lasting effect.36 Part V concludes that, 
to restore integrity to California’s bail reform movement, the legislature should 
require input from the voices of community-based and grassroots 
organizations—many of which the drafters of SB 10 ultimately excluded—to 
ensure the success of SB 10’s goals.37 
II. CASH BAIL AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Understanding the current problems associated with bail reform requires an 
understanding of how the function and use of bail has changed throughout the 
history of the United States.38 Section A explains the history and purpose of cash 
bail in the United States.39 Part B then explains the negative repercussions of 
cash bail and the pretrial detention that occurs when a defendant cannot pay that 
bail.40 
A. What is the History and Purpose of Cash Bail? 
Bail, in general, refers to the practice of releasing defendants pretrial and has 
existed in Anglo-Saxon legal systems for hundreds of years.41 Bail’s original 
intent was to ensure the appearance of the defendant at trial.42 Courts placed little 
 
been struggling to enact meaningful bail reform since Governor Brown’s 1979 State of the State address).  
32.  Infra Part VII. 
33.  Infra Part VI. 
34.  Infra Part II. 
35.  Infra Part III. 
36.  Infra Part IV. 
37.  Infra Part V.  
38.  See Wykstra, supra note 20 (providing a brief history of bail in order demonstrating how that history 
prompted and informs the current bail reform movement). 
39.  Infra Section II.A. 
40.  Infra Section II.B.  
41.  SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 18 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017) (ebook). 
42.  Lauren Kelleher, Out on Bail: What New York Can Learn from D.C. About Solving a Money Bail 
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focus on the accused’s guilt or the likelihood that he would commit a crime 
before trial while released.43 
Although defendants may obtain bail through a number of methods, 
jurisdictions across the country have increasingly employed the use of money 
bail.44 Under the money bail regime, a judge sets bail at an amount that is 
“reasonably calculated” to ensure the appearance of the defendant at trial.45 At 
the outset of the country’s criminal justice system, only those accused of a capital 
offense could not receive bail and the courts presumed release for all others.46 
Starting in the 1940s, the presumption of release’s original intention as the 
norm under the bail system began to erode as judges unofficially started to weigh 
flight risk and other substantive evidence with no connection to that risk.47 
Congress codified this change in policy with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
46.48 The change allowed the courts to consider the “weight of the evidence 
against [the defendant]” as well as the “characteristics of the [defendant]” when 
determining bail.49 The policy gave judges substantial discretion and resulted in 
an increase in the number of pretrial detentions in the United States.50 In many 
cases, pretrial detention resulted not because of a defendant’s objective danger to 
the community or his high probability of flight risk, but because a judge set bail 
at an amount higher than the defendant could afford, sometimes based on the 
judge’s own subjective motivations.51 
As early as the 1960s, political leaders understood the consequences of 
money bail in practice.52 For example, President Johnson proclaimed that the 
poor defendant “languishes in jail weeks, months, and perhaps even years. . . not 
because he is guilty. . . [but] because he is poor.”53 In a nationwide effort to 
reduce pretrial incarceration related to the imperfect bail system, Congress 
enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1966.54 To reduce the disproportionate effect 
money bail had on poor communities, the law allowed a judge to exercise 
discretion to detain a defendant if release would not “reasonably assure the 
 
Problem, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 802 (2016). 
43.  Id. 
44.  JUST. POL’Y INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR 
BAIL (Sept. 2012), available at 
www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail_executive_summary.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).  
45.  Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
46.  BAUGHMAN, supra note 41. 
47.  Id. at 19. 
48.  Id. at 21.  
49.  18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2017). 
50.  BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 21–22.  
51.  Wykstra, supra note 20. 
52.  Rachel Smith, Condemned to Repeat History? Why the Last Movement for Bail Reform Failed, and 
How This One Can Succeed, 25 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 451, 454451 (2018). 
53.  Id. at 451. 
54.  BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 23. 
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appearance of the person as required.”55 The idea was that judges would consider 
alternatives to detention when deciding whether to incarcerate someone pretrial.56 
Although the law did not explicitly authorize judges to consider risk when 
determining bail, it allowed judges to weigh the evidence against the defendant 
pretrial to determine whether to grant bail and at what amount.57 The Court did 
not perceive the practice of weighing evidence of guilt pretrial as punishment.58 
Instead, its acceptance of the practice framed pretrial detention as serving the 
legitimate and compelling government interest of protecting the public.59 
Ultimately, the law counteracted the positive effects it could have had on the 
increasing pretrial detention levels which it sought to reduce.60 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 embraced the practices that emerged through 
previous bail reform efforts.61 The law authorized courts to “preventively detain 
defendants pretrial where they found bail would not ‘reasonably assure [a 
defendant’s] appearance . . . or [would] endanger the safety of any other person 
or the community.’”62 The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
law in United States. v. Salerno, holding that pretrial detention is not necessarily 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.63 Furthermore, the 
Court held that the government’s interest in community safety can, under some 
circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.64 According to the 
Court, the Act provided sufficient procedural safeguards for a judge to accurately 
determine the future dangerousness of a defendant to satisfy Due Process under 
the Constitution.65 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allowed judges to consider the potential 
dangerousness of a defendant.66 Despite variations in how judges make bail 
decisions, the Bail Reform Act was the last landmark piece of national bail 
reform legislation in the United States and continues as the status quo.67 
Consequently, bail determinations, even in the absence of cash bail, continue to 
disproportionately affect the poor, people of color, and the communities to which 
those people belong.68 
 
55.  § 3142).  
56.  BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 24. 
57.  Id. 
58.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).  
59.  Id. at 749.  
60.  BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 27. 
61.  Wykstra, supra note 20. 
62.  Kelleher, supra note 42 at 804. 
63.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. 
64.  Id. at 740. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Wykstra, supra note 20. 
67.  Id. 
68.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 2 at 2. 
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B. Cash Bail, Pretrial Detention, and Their Negative Impact on Families and 
Communities 
Understanding why laws such as SB 10 that promise reductions in 
unnecessary pretrial detention, but do not deliver requires comprehending the 
cash bail system’s negative consequences and how they arise.69 Additionally, an 
understanding of these issues demonstrates why Congress and society in general 
should embrace other methods of addressing these drawbacks.70 Proponents of 
the cash bail system argue that it leads to greater pretrial accountability and 
creates incentives for a person to appear at trial.71 However, the evidence 
presents a much more complex reality.72 Under this reality, the cash bail system 
has increased pretrial detention rates because various factors adversely affect 
outcomes in cases of those who cannot afford bail.73 
Between 1999 and 2014, the number of people held in pretrial detention 
accounted for 99% of the jail population growth.74 Additionally, on any day, 60% 
of the jail population is awaiting trial.75 As of 2017, local jails across the country 
hold around 465,000 people awaiting trial.76 Of those detained, the median bail 
amount is around $10,000 with states such as California imposing average bail 
amounts of around $50,000.77 Further, even smaller bail amounts become 
prohibitively expensive when, as of 2015, the average inmate earned only 
$15,109 prior to incarceration, and the median bail amount equals eight months 
income for the average detained defendant.78 As a result, the U.S. criminal justice 
system detains hundreds of thousands of people without regard to their guilt or 
 
69.  Infra Section III.C.  
70.  Infra Part VI.  
71.  Jazmine Ulloa, Bail Bond Industry Moves to Block Sweeping California Law, Submitting Signatures 
for a 2020 Ballot Referendum, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-
referendum-signatures-20181120-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
72.  Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (Apr. 2016).   
73.  Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor 
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 722 (Mar. 2017) (identifying factors that create poor outcomes for 
bailees including increased incentives to plead guilty, inability to prepare a defense, reduced financial resources 
available for defense, no ability to demonstrate positive behavior, inability to obstruct the prosecution, and a 
lack of the advantage of long delay).   
74.  Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).   
75.  JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 44. 
76.  Wendy Sawyer, How Does Unaffordable Money Bail Affect Families?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/08/15/pretrial/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review).  
77.  HUM. RTS. WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL 
SYSTEM UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 34 (2017), available at 
https://hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/usabail0417_web_0.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
78. Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the Poor: How Money Bail Perpetuates an Endless 
Cycle of Poverty and Jail Time, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 2 (May 10, 2016), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/incomejails.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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innocence.79 
Progressive reformers across the nation agree both that cash bail does not 
work80 and that pretrial detention serves to disadvantage those communities 
comprising poor people and people of color.81 Additionally, reformers also 
agree—perhaps differing as to what degree—that the use of pretrial detention 
directly drives mass incarceration by depriving communities of valuable 
resources they need to succeed.82 A 2015 report from the Ella Baker Center for 
Human Rights found that pretrial incarceration generates economic instability 
and a lack of mobility for inmates and their families by saddling them with fees, 
fines, and debts that accrue during incarceration.83 Adding to that financial 
hardship, incarceration eliminates a wage earner and makes it impossible to 
satisfy basic needs while attending to the accumulating costs of defending one’s 
innocence.84 With the average debt-load associated with court fees and fines 
amounting to over $13,000,85 some released defendants and their families turn to 
crime to make ends meet; interestingly, over 40% of all crimes are directly 
attributable to poverty and 80% of inmates are low-income.86 
In addition to the financial strain that pretrial incarceration places on inmates 
and their families, such detention has detrimental effects on the mental health and 
general well-being of those families.87 First, pretrial detention generally places a 
majority of the familial responsibility on the spouses, partners, and other family 
members of the detained person.88 They become responsible not only for 
providing for themselves and the family, but also for ensuring the release of the 
defendant.89 Additionally, the high cost of phone calls and visits, especially for 
those who do not live near their loved one’s place of incarceration, make the 
maintenance of a meaningfully sustaining emotional relationship prohibitively 
 
79.  Id. at 1. 
80.  Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 492 (2018). 
81.  Essie Justice Group, Open Letter to the Bail Industry (Aug. 14, 2018), 
http://essiejusticegroup.org/2018/08/open-letter-to-the-bail-industry (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (statement signed by 28 grassroots organizations opposing California’s bail reform legislation) 
(“‘Good bail reform” leads to less incarceration. . . reduces racial disparities in the criminal justice system. . . 
[and] has no direct cost to individuals and families. . . .”).  
82.  Id.  
83.  SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA WALTERS, & AZADEH ZOHRABI, WHO 
PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 7 (2015), http://whopaysreport.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
84.  Id. 
85. Id. at 9. 
86.  Id. 
87. Id. at 11. 
88.  See generally MEGAN COMFORT, DOING TIME TOGETHER: LOVE AND FAMILY IN THE SHADOW OF 
PRISON 9–11 (2009) http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uopacific/detail.action?docID=432206 (detailing her 
interactions with the female partners of male inmates and identifying the way in which “secondary 
prisonization” affects those women even though they themselves are not incarcerated); DEVUONO-POWELL, 
supra note 83 at 11.  
89.  Id. at 9. 
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expensive.90 
III. CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
In 2016, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Tani Cantil-Sakauye, 
established a working group to study California’s bail system to generate 
recommendations for California’s legislature to ameliorate the state’s bail 
system.91 The report found that California’s system “unnecessarily compromises 
victim and public safety because it bases a person’s liberty on financial resources 
rather than the likelihood of future criminal behavior and exacerbates 
socioeconomic disparities and racial bias.”92 
The report highlighted several aforementioned problems and recognized that 
the bail system could affect many aspects of a person’s life including, 
employment, housing, childcare, and healthcare.93 Furthermore, the report 
emphasized the fact that whether a person can pay bail affects the outcome of the 
case and the sentence.94 As a result, many defendants, regardless of guilt, plead 
guilty in order to obtain release and avoid the collateral consequences of their 
arrest.95 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and the working group recommended that the 
legislature replace the use of cash bail with RAS.96Such systems utilize 
algorithms to determine whether a defendant is too dangerous for release from 
detention.97 The authors of SB 10 heeded this recommendation and made RAS 
the foundation of SB 10, leading many to wonder whether the law would serve to 
address the cash bail system’s problems.98 Part A provides a brief overview of 
SB 10.99 Parts B and C then show that, despite the potential for some benefit, the 
law’s reliance on RAS serves to replicate the effects that occurred under the cash 
bail system, but perhaps with even greater alleged legitimacy.100 
A. Overview of SB 10 
Signed into law August 28, 2018 and originally slated to take effect on 
 
90.  Id. at 7. 
91.  PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM—RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. at 13. 
94.  Id. at 13–14. 
95.  Id. at 14. 
96.  Id. at 51. 
97.  Id. at 53. 
98.  Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are so Many Reformers Unhappy About It?, 
POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/29/california-abolish-cash-bail-
reformers-unhappy-219618 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
99.  Infra Section III.A. 
100.  Infra Sections III.B–C.  
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
11 
October 1, 2019, SB 10 set out to eliminate the cash bail system in California.101 
Under the law, the California pretrial release system moves from a money-based 
system to a risk-based release and detention system with the goal of releasing a 
defendant with “the least restrictive nonmonetary condition or combination of 
conditions that will reasonably assure public safety and the defendant’s return to 
court.” 102 To determine whether a court can release a defendant in a manner that 
will “reasonably assure public safety,” SB 10 mandates the implementation of 
risk assessment systems across California.103 
Although many California counties already use RAS to set bail amounts, 
sentencing, and make other decisions,104 under SB 10, those systems would 
determine if a person is considered low, medium, or high risk and, therefore, 
whether conditions exist to reasonably release him into the public.105 Critics of 
the law’s language argue that it results in an unconstitutional presumption of 
detention for individuals deemed high-risk and it potentially allows the detention 
of virtually anyone pretrial.106 
In addition, these opposition groups criticize the lack of standards the law 
creates for determining what qualifies as low, medium, or high risk.107 
Furthermore, because of the nature of RAS, it is difficult to monitor whether the 
system accounts for implicit bias because of empirical limitations and 
inconsistencies among counties.108 The fact that the pretrial assessment services 
will not be independent from probation services compounds this problem.109 
 
101.  S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 27771).  
102.  Id. 
103.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7 (enacted by Chapter 1.5) (West). 
104.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Improve SB 10, Don’t Eliminate It, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 27, 2019), 
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article225032170 (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review); see also Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 71–72 (Oct. 2018) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law School) (highlighting the California Rules of Court that have “allowed courts to 
consider risk assessment information in determining the length and conditions of an individual’s period of 
mandatory supervision”).  
105.  S.B. 10, supra note 101. 
106.  Jeff Adachi, Proposed California Money Bail Bill Will Set Back Reform Effort, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 
14, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Proposed-California-money-bail-bill-will-
set-back-13156297.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Eric Westervelt, California’s 
Bail Overhaul May Do More Harm Than Good, Reformers Say, NPR (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/651959950/californias-bail-overhaul-may-do-more-harm-than-good-reformers-
say (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Under SB 10, now prosecutors can see detention 
for virtually any crime. . ..Regardless of whether it’s violent or involves weapons or whether the person accused 
has a prior history. Under this law prosecutors have the discretion to seek pre-emptive detention of a person 
with no criminal record charged with a low-level misdemeanor”).  
107.  John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Comments on California Judicial Council Bail Reform Rules, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/10/human-rights-watch-comments-
california-judicial-council-bail-reform-rules (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
108.  Note, S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018): California Replaces Money-Bail System 
with Pretrial Detention System, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2103–04 (2019).  
109.  SV De-Bug, Silicon Valley De-Bug’s Letter of Opposition to California’s False Bail Reform Bill 
(SB10), DE-BUG (Aug. 14, 2018), https://siliconvalleydebug.org/stories/silicon-valley-de-bug-s-letter-of-
opposition-to-california-s-false-bail-reform-bill-sb10 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); 
2019 / Why California’s Elimination of Cash Bail May Have Missed the Mark 
12 
Although the Judicial Council proposed a rule that would suggest that pretrial 
services consult with community organizations as “appropriate,” the language 
provides no definition for what constitutes as “appropriate” and makes the course 
of action discretionary instead of mandatory.110 The combination of these effects 
leads the opponents of SB 10 to believe that it will not produce its intended 
results.111 
B. Referendum 
Article II, Section 9, of the California Constitution provides for a referendum 
process whereby electors have the power to approve or reject legislation that state 
representatives have passed.112 In order to qualify to appear on a future ballot, 
those seeking a referendum must receive signatures in a number equal to five 
percent of the ballots cast for Governor in the last gubernatorial race.113 They 
must also file the necessary petitions with county election officials.114 
In January of 2019, supporters of the bail industry did just that and qualified 
a referendum to appear on the November 3, 2020 General Election ballot.115 
Accordingly, SB 10 will not take effect in October of 2019 until voters decide 
whether to adopt the law.116 Furthermore, California will not adopt the rules SB 
10 requires the Judicial Council of California to produce to aid in the 
implementation of SB 10 until after the referendum process.117 
In a state with over 3000 bail bondsmen, the referendum’s proponents had no 
problem achieving well over the 365,880 required signatures to postpone and 
possibly defeat the law’s implementation.118 These people argue that the law 
would decimate the two billion dollar national bail industry and lead to the 
release of violent offenders who could harm the public.119 The industry managed 
to gather these signatures as well as over three million dollars in only two 
months—no small feat—which suggests that cash bail supporters could pose a 
 
Statement of Opposition to Senate Bill 10, ESSIE JUSTICE GROUP (Aug. 14, 2018), 
http://essiejusticegroup.org/2018/08/essie-justice-group-withdraws-support-for-sb-10/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
110.  Ralphling, supra note 107. 
111.  ESSIE JUSTICE GROUP, supra note 109; SV De-Bug, supra note 109; Raphling, supra note 107. 
112.  CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9.  
113.  Referendum, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, https://sos.ca.gov/selections/ballot-
measures/referendum/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
114.  Id. 
115.  Ulloa, supra note 29. 
116.  Michael McGough, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry Will Now Be Decided on the 2020 
Ballot, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 17. 2019), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article224682595.html (available online at The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
117.  Ulloa, supra note 29. 
118.  McGough, supra note 116.  
119.  Ulloa, supra note 29. 
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formidable opposition to SB 10.120 
C. Risk Assessment Systems and Implicit Bias 
Although SB 10’s author is confident it will become the “law of the land,”121 
the bail bonds industry is not the only group opposed to SB 10 as Governor 
Brown signed it into law.122 Civil rights groups and other organizations, such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union, support overhauling the bail system, but 
they do not support the bill’s presumption of preventive detention.123 Critics 
argue that the RAS that SB 10 utilizes reinforces various societal biases—based 
on race, economics, and gender—that the systems inevitably reproduce.124 
Although SB 10’s author introduced a subsequent proposition that would require 
counties to gather data regarding how they implement SB 10,125 many believe the 
system’s users cannot account for the implicit bias inherent in the systems, 
especially when judges rely solely on these assessments as they can under SB 
10.126 
The nationwide trend has generally been employing RAS instead of cash bail 
to determine who presents a high enough risk where the system can reasonably 
detain people before trial without offending notions of due process or equal 
protection.127 However, because the use of RAS is relatively new, much 
speculation and relatively little data has arisen concerning the merits of such 
systems.128 Reviewing the data from states that have relied heavily on RAS, such 
states as New Jersey and Kentucky, may offer insight into the efficacy and 
desirability of RAS.129 
 
120.  Id.  
121.  Id. 
122.  Infra Part V.  
123.  Daisy Vieyra, ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Regulation, ACLU S. 
CAL. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-california-changes-position-oppose-
bail-reform-legislation (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
124.  Ulloa, supra note 29.  
125.  S.B. 36, 2018 Leg., 2018–2019 Sess. (Cal. 2019).  
126.  Sam Levin, Imprisoned by Algorithms: The Dark Side of California Ending Cash Bail, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/07/imprisoned-by-algorithms-the-dark-side-of-
california-ending-cash-bail (on file with The University of the Pacific Law School) (“There is no evidence 
suggesting that these kinds of algorithms have produced positive changes when implemented, said Megan T. 
Stevenson, a George Mason University Professor who studied risk assessment. . . .”); but see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Improve SB 10, Don’t Eliminate It, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 27, 2019), 
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article225032170.html (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (“No matter the fate of SB 10, SB 36 is important in seeking to improve outcomes and 
transparency in pretrial risk assessment tools and practices”).  
127.  See Glen Dalakian, Open the Jail Doors, Hal: A Guarded Embrace of Pretrial Risk Assessment 
Instruments, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 325, 350 (Oct. 2018) (arguing that “policymakers should experiment with 
risk assessment instruments as a component of their bail reform efforts, but only if appropriate safeguards are in 
place”).  
128.  Id. at 328. 
129.  See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, BAIL REFORM: A 
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Groups that oppose using RAS, or at least complete dependence on RAS, 
argue that these systems will generate the same racial and wealth biases that 
current bail systems create because those algorithms already reflect those 
biases.130 Although the inability to pay bail would not prevent a court from 
releasing a person, a court can consider several factors including age, crime 
charged, neighborhood, and prior criminal history without regard to any other 
mitigating circumstances depending on how the court utilizes its RAS.131 As 
jurisdictions around the country increase their reliance on RAS and move toward 
eliminating cash bail, concerns arise that these systems often neglect to 
sufficiently consider the rights of the defendant as a matter of both law and 
policy.132 Although these concerns likely prevent grassroots organizations and 
other civil rights groups from supporting SB 10, they almost certainly will not 
join the bail industry to preserve the status quo: using cash bail and pretrial 
detention.133 Instead, these groups will likely focus efforts on other methods of 
bail reform that generate more tangible and immediate results.134 
 
IV. COMMUNITY-BASED DEFENSE 
In conversations concerning criminal justice reform, political commentators 
and reformers emphasize the middle and back ends of the system.135 That is, 
reformers stress providing services for incarcerated and newly-released 
inmates.136 Many jurisdictions across the country have implemented such reforms 
like providing incentives for early release to individuals presently incarcerated.137 
However, jurisdictions do not focus nearly as much energy on the front end of 
 
GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICY MAKERS 39, 44 (Feb. 2019), available at 
cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(discussing the principles of reform necessary to generate positive bail reform including a careful approach to 
risk assessment systems).  
130.  Alexis Wilson Briggs, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using Profile-Based Risk Assessment 
in Bail Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 17, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/human-rights-
watch-advises-against-using-profile-based-risk-assessment-bail-reform# (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
131.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 129 at 34. 
132.  Koepke, supra note 26 at 1806. 
133.  ACLU of Northern California Statement on Referendum to Repeal Bail Reform Legislation, ACLU 
of Northern California (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-northern-california-statement-
referendum-repeal-bail-reform-legislation (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
134.  Infra Part VI.  
135.  See German Lopez, The First Step Act, Congress’s Criminal Justice Reform Bill, Explained, VOX 
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/12/3/18122392/first-step-act-criminal-justice-
reform-bill-congress (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting the main features of 
the most recent criminal justice reform bill, which focuses primarily on sentencing reform).  
136. German Lopez, Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, VOX (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/22/17377324/first-step-act-prison-reform-congress (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
137.  Id. 
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the system where people first engage with the criminal justice system.138 
Part A of this section highlights the rise of innovative bail reform tactics in 
the early 1990s.139 Parts B and C focus on community-based defense and 
community-based organizations and highlight the positive effects such 
approaches to bail reform have on the community and on the public.140 
A. A Shift in Bail Reform 
The most recent efforts in bail reform have emphasized offering direct 
community services to the accused and their families prior to trial.141 Probation 
and Pretrial services, the community corrections arm of the federal judiciary, 
often provides these services142 However, the existence of such services outside 
of the control of law enforcement is necessary for those services’ continued 
success.143 But, independence is difficult because taxpayers are less willing to 
pay for pre-conviction social services than for law enforcement under which 
services after release are generally included.144 Due to these limitations, 
community-based reform has emerged as a viable method of addressing the bail 
systems in the United States.145 Because of their flexibility, adaptability, and 
willingness to address the root causes of mass incarceration and the failures of 
our criminal justice systems, these community-based organizations represent the 
 
138.  Eli Hager & Bill Keller, Everything You Know About Mass Incarceration is Wrong: Or At Least 
Misleading, Says this Contrarian Scholar. Here’s Why It Matters., THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 09, 2017), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/02/09/everything-you-think-you-know-about-mass-incarceration-is-
wrong (on file with The University of the Pacific law Review) (“Most reform efforts focus on getting people out 
of prison by shortening or abolishing minimum sentences, hastening the work of parole boards, awarding 
‘earned time’ for good behavior, and the like”).  
139.  Infra Section IV.A. 
140.  Infra Sections IV.B–C.  
141.  See, e.g., Zach Despart, Proposed Bail Lawsuit Settlement Includes Child Care, Phones, Rides for 
Poor Defendants, HOUSTON CHRON. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Proposed-bail-lawsuit-settlement-includes-child-13764225.php (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting the settlement in a court case that required the county to 
provide various pretrial services to assist defendants in appearing). 
142.  US COURTS, PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVICES—MISSION, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-pretrial-services-mission (last visited Dec. 15, 2018).  
143.  NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, A FRAMEWORK FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF 
EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL SYST. & AGENCY 32 (Feb. 2017), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/pdr-nat-research-
a_framework_for_pretrial_justice_essential_elements_of_an_effective_pretrial_system_and_agnecy.pdf (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
144.  See, e.g., Jacob Ogles, Study Predicts High Costs for Pre-Trial Release, FLAPOL (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://floridapolitics.com/archives/291696-university-tampa-pre-trial-release291696 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating the fear that some people have regarding the elimination 
of the bail bonds industry and the possibility of taxpayers having to pay for pretrial services). 
145.  See Matt Sledge, Community Bail Fund for Poor Defendants To Launch In Brooklyn, HUFFPOST 
(Mar. 23, 2015), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brooklyn-community-bail-fund_n_6886836 (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the launch of the Brooklyn Community Bail 
Fund, a nonprofit working in conjunction with the Brooklyn Defender Services to assist the pretrial process).   
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most assured way to implement lasting changes in bail reform.146 
In the mid-1980s, when bail’s purpose moved from preventing flight risk to 
preventing a defendant from committing further crimes, the Vera Institute 
identified the issue that low-income individuals were unlikely to satisfy the 
criteria necessary to demonstrate community ties to attain release and also were 
unlikely to afford bail no matter the amount.147 In response, Vera “sought to 
create a pretrial supervision program so good that it [could] compete with jail–
one that [could] virtually guarantee that defendants under supervision [would] 
neither abscond nor commit new crimes.”148 
Although the approach raised concerns about the equivalence of pretrial 
detention and intensive supervised release, it also afforded medium and high-risk 
defendants the ability to avoid incarceration and its negative repercussions by 
ensuring judges that—with proper treatment and training for the defendant—jail 
time is unnecessary.149 Furthermore, it utilized government funds in an 
innovative way: shifting the spending to front-end prevention rather than to back-
end remedies.150 Ultimately, Vera changed functions as other advocacy groups 
launched different projects to address bail, but not without first demonstrating 
that community investment can assuage the concerns of law enforcement and 
judicial officials over releasing potentially dangerous defendants back into the 
community.151 
B. Community-Bail Funds 
Under the same model as the Vera Institute, the Bronx Freedom Fund 
emerged as an outgrowth of the Institute’s work.152 The fund works to provide 
bail in the amount of $2,000 or less to defendants who can not afford it.153 The 
organization created a charitable revolving bail fund in which it used the same 
funds repeatedly to pay the bail of those who could not.154 In 2017, the Bronx 
Freedom Fund evolved into The Bail Project, a national organization with the 
 
146.  Supra Section III.C.  
147.  Andrea Clisura, None of Their Business: The Need for Another Alternative to New York’s Bail Bond 
Business, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 307, 322 (2010). 
148.  Id. at 323. 
149.  Id. at 324–25. 
150.  Id. at 325. 
151.  Logan Abernathy, Bailing Out: The Constitutional and Policy Benefits of Community and Nonprofit 
Bail Funds, 42 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 90 (2018) (arguing that community bail funds are the best way to 
resolve competing interests).  
152.  Alan Feuer, Bronx Charity Founder Wants to Pay Bail for Poor Defendants Nationwide, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/nyregion/bail-project-fund-poor-defendants.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
153.  Jaime Williams, Borough’s Charitable Bail Fund Touts Success, BRONX TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), 
https://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2015/9/09-fund-2015-02-27-bx_2015_9.html (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
154.  Id. 
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goal of securing freedom for as many people as possible utilizing the sort of 
revolving bail fund that worked so effectively in the Bronx.155 By organizing 
under the model of a revolving bail fund, reformers can focus on specific 
jurisdictions in need, recycling the monetary resources that various actors invest 
in the project.156 
Coordinating this movement through community-driven efforts instead of 
through law enforcement organizations avoids the red tape associated with 
government action and the political implications that often limit bail reform.157 
Although general community bail funds do not fully remedy the problems 
associated with cash bail because not everybody is an ideal candidate to be bailed 
out by such funds, they do represent a foundational change in the bail reform 
movement.158 They do so by transferring action and accountability to 
communities that have a concrete interest in bail reform rather than leaving them 
in the hands of disinterested politicians or those with only a tangential connection 
to the issue.159 Such funds can serve to address the problems associated with bail 
by offering a solution during the transition period from cash bail to its 
replacement, whatever that may be.160 
C. Community-Based Organizations 
United States law defines Community-Based Organizations (“CBOs”) as any 
public or private nonprofit that “is representative of a community or significant 
segments of the community” and “provides education or related services to 
individuals in the community.”161 Aside from providing the actual money for 
bail, the CBOs that evolved from Vera Institute’s model offer an excellent 
example of how these organizations can serve the community—both the accused 
and others—to reduce levels of incarceration.162 The Bronx Freedom Fund, 
initially mentioned above, organized as the Bronx Defenders in 2007 to provide 
bail to those unable to afford it by using a revolving bail fund.163 However, much 
of the Fund’s success now exists in providing services to those for whom it 
provides bail to ensure that those people appear for their court appearances after 
 
155.  Feuer, supra note 152. 
156.  See Abernathy, supra note 151 at 90–92 (explaining the way in which a community bail fund 
functions).  
157.  Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 586, 637 (2017).   
158.  Alysia Santo, Bail Reformers Aren’t Waiting for Bail Reform, They’re Using Charity to Set Poor 
Defendants Free, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/23/bail-reformers-aren-t-waiting-for-bail-reform (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).   
159.  See Abernathy, supra note 151 at 94 (arguing that community bail funds are the best way to resolve 
competing interests).  
160.  Infra Part IV.A.  
161.  20 U.S.C.A § 7801(6) (West).  
162.  Simonson, supra note 157 at 590–92. 
163.  Clisura, supra 147 at 315. 
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the fund posts bail.164 Such tactics allowed the organization to bail almost 150 
people from October 2013 to October 2014, with 98% of those people making 
their required court appearances.165 
Another fund, the Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, works with referring 
agencies and other social service providers to give pretrial defendants access to 
re-entry support including attorneys, housing and education workers, and 
employment agencies.166 The Fund has kept over 4,000 people out of pretrial 
detention where they would have been more likely to plead guilty and where they 
would have had less access to defense-building strategies that could keep them 
out of jail.167 Ninety-five percent of all inmates for whom the Fund obtained 
release made their appearances regardless of the level of risk the court found 
those defendants to pose.168 Additionally, courts were three times more likely to 
dismiss those defendants’ charges, and the defendants received more favorable 
outcomes than if they did not have help from the fund.169 
Although a number of jurisdictions implement social services following a 
person’s conviction, few provide pre-trial services that serve to prevent the initial 
interactions with the criminal justice system that often start an endless and 
repetitive process of incarceration.170 Furthermore, in those that do, it is parole 
entities and other government bodies run by law enforcement that offer such 
services.171 CBOs can tailor the social services they offer to address varied 
individual community needs and take action in response to community voices 
because CBOs comprise people that the criminal justice system has directly 
affected.172 
Additionally, for people without ties to the community and with no way for a 
defendant to demonstrate to a judge that she should release him before trial, these 
groups can intervene to provide the necessary ties and services to demonstrate to 
 
164.  The Bronx Freedom Fund, One Year Report 2 (Nov. 2014). 
165.  Id.  
166.  BROOKLYN DEFENDERS, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016), available at https://bds.org/wp-
content/uploads/BDS-2016-Annual-Report.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).   
167.  BROOKLYN COMMUNITY BAIL FUND, https://brooklynbailfund.org/our-results-1 (last visited Nov. 
15, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).   
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. 
170.  See generally Amber Taylor, A Free Start: Community-Based Organization as an Antidote to the 
Mass Incarceration of Women Pretrial, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 51 (2015) (detailing how inadequate 
pretrial services and defense often lead to longer sentences and future recidivism).  
171.  See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, PROMISING PRACTICES IN PROVIDING PRETRIAL SERVICES 
FUNCTIONS WITHIN PROBATION AGENCIES: A USER’S GUIDE 13 (June 2010) (“In recent years, many [. . .]. . . 
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with The University of the Pacific School of Law).  
172.  Taylor, supra note 170 at 59. (arguing that individual-led provisions of service focusing on the 
tailoring of support to the individual needs of a defendant most effectively accomplish the goals of pretrial 
detention and bail).  
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that judge that release is not only tenable, but also desirable.173 These groups 
demonstrate that in communities where individuals participate and maintain a 
stake in the well-being of the community’s citizens, less law enforcement is 
necessary, and, incarceration both pre and post-trial decreases.174 
V. CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 
Despite the clear success that many CBOs have had throughout the country 
in providing direct pretrial services and funds to the accused pretrial, the inability 
of those groups to gain the support of local and state officials has stymied such 
action.175 Today, CBOs function in a number of different ways; in some 
jurisdictions, local legislatures channel funding to community bail funds and 
other non-profits that work in tandem with local public defenders to provide the 
services detailed in the previous section.176 In others, the legislature promulgates 
laws that facilitate community bail funds and other forms of community defense 
and rehabilitation by permitting the funds to post bail whereas other state laws 
would have denied them that right.177 
For example, the state lawmakers enacted the New York Charitable Bail Act 
of 2012 to allow non-profit organizations in New York to pay bail in the amount 
of $2,000 or less for those defendants that cannot afford it.178 The legislature 
passed the law in direct response to a court decision where the judge rejected the 
Bronx Freedom Fund’s posted bail because he was concerned with the unknown 
identities of the individuals who provided the bail.179 The legislation allowed the 
Brooklyn Bail Fund to continue evolving to serve the community’s needs, while 
removing obstacles, like the court decision above, that prevent community 
organizers from doing their work.180 
Many are concerned about defendants using nontraditional sources to pay 
bail.181 As a result, some commentators claim these crowdfunding sources, such 
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as Go Fund Me, are illegitimate bail sources.182 Conversations surrounding cash 
bail sources beyond traditional bondsmen often center around the argument that a 
person will not feel the same obligation to appear if someone with whom the 
person has no connection pays the bail insuring his appearance.183 Although this 
argument is initially compelling, it doubly disadvantages indigent 
defendants;184indigent defendants are likely unable to afford even a small amount 
of bail, and they are unlikely to have any meaningful connection to the 
community to which they belong.185 
Bail funds, CBOs, and other methods of community defense assuage these 
concerns by providing the community connection the defendant previously 
lacked.186 Focusing on community defense allows groups to combat the notion 
that dangerous defendants will not appear at trial and will commit crimes in the 
interim.187 This should demonstrate to courts the strong likelihood of the 
defendant’s appearance at trial without employing the use of pretrial detention.188 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENSURING COMMUNITY ACCESS TO AND IMPACT 
ON THE BAIL REFORM CONVERSATION 
A system relying on community defense would ideally task legislatures with 
developing standards to determine the legitimacy of bail that comes from 
individuals and from charitable bail funds.189 This is because some argue that 
“bail funds may [] usurp the traditional democratic process.”190 However, most 
states have already enacted those regulations for commercial bail bonds 
businesses, so a regulatory model already exists191 A gradual erosion of the bail 
industry by removing for-profit bail businesses would help the bail reform 
movement gain further traction by eliminating a large impediment to the political 
success of cash bail reform.192 Weakening of the bail bonds industry would, in 
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turn, release some pressure on legislators from a billion-dollar industry.193 
Part A of this section demonstrates that by enacting regulations that allow 
certain groups to provide bail and other bail services, local legislatures can ease 
the weight on their own coffers while providing bail reformers the capital they 
need to run as successful ventures.194 Furthermore, such regulations would 
address concerns regarding donations coming from legitimate sources.195 These 
regulations would allow CBOs and other bail funds to more seamlessly enter the 
political process to impact meaningful bail reform.196 Part B then highlights a 
model through which local jurisdictions could address bail reform until voters 
decide SB 10’s fate.197 
A. California’s Neglect of Community-Based Organizations in Implementing Bail 
Reform and Its Need for Their Input 
To illustrate, a coalition of nine groups representing different stakeholders 
originally supported California’s SB 10.198 By the time Governor Brown signed 
the bill into law, almost all the CBOs that initiated the law’s ascent withdrew 
their support for it.199 They cited cooption by the bill’s authors and the remaining 
groups that supported the authors’ conception of the bill.200 
Such groups as Essie Justice Group argue that reform done in the name of 
low-income black and brown people should substantively help those people.201 
However, because the voices most dedicated to the plight of that demographic 
were shut out of the legislative process, the law Governor Brown signed does not 
reflect their views.202 As such, the groups that once represented a driving 
coalition in California’s bail reform movement are no longer working in tandem, 
leaving them without the force necessary to drive lasting change and placing the 
success of such bold reform movements as SB 10 in a precarious position.203 
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However, in an effort to assuage some of the concerns of these grassroots 
organizations, Governor Brown signed SB 10 into law as an implementation bill, 
with the California Judicial Council to prescribe the rules of implementation.204 
At the end of 2018, the Council produced its first set of draft rules for public 
comment with the hope of garnering more support for the bill.205 One such 
provision would “require[] courts to. . .consult with local resource providers, as 
appropriate, including the county behavioral health agency and community-based 
organizations that provide support for defendants and for victims. . .” in 
implementing the new system of pretrial detention.206 
Although the remaining language of the draft rules leaves much unsettled, a 
change to this provision could allow access to the process from which SB 10 
ultimately excluded certain community-based organizations.207 By including 
language requiring local courts and other criminal justice system actors to consult 
community-based organizations continuously and not only “as appropriate,” the 
judicial council’s rules could garner much more support than the language of the 
proposed rules.208 The current language, according to critics, would allow local 
jurisdictions to bypass working with these organizations or to limit the amount of 
input that they have in developing the systems that each jurisdiction will use.209 
Such a system likely would lead to a neglect of defendant’s rights which, as 
demonstrated above, does not serve to protect the community or the defendant.210 
Rules requiring consultation with CBOs, however, would give the entire system 
more legitimacy by ensuring that political actors respond to all voices so that the 
movement represents more competing interests and nuanced views.211 
B. Moving Forward 
Because SB 10 will not go into effect until after November 2020, if at all, 
reformers need to continue brainstorming solutions to the problems cash bail 
causes if the reform movement wants to avoid stalling.212 Governor Newsom, 
who allocated 75 million dollars in his budget to the Judicial Council in its efforts 
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to aid in implementing SB 10,213 should also allocate money to the myriad 
community-defense oriented groups that currently act within in the state to 
ameliorate the conditions of those that bail affects, even as SB 10 is in limbo.214 
The chance encounter between the head deputy of the Compton Public 
Defender’s Office, Jane Newman, and Robin Steinberg, the founder of the Bail 
Project and the Bronx Defenders, serves as one such example of how the state 
could accomplish this.215 After meeting, the two women managed to create a 
three-way partnership under which the non-profit Bail Project will work with 
UCLA’s law students and the Public Defender’s Office to implement 
community-defense in which the partnership focuses on the defendant’s needs to 
avoid any pretrial detention and its associated costs.216 In the clinic, “students 
work closely with their client’s families and community supporters to present 
judges with whole pictures of their clients.”217 In communities such as Compton, 
where seven out of ten clients the public defender’s office represents cannot 
afford bail, there is an obvious need for such collaboration.218 
The coalition has already secured the release of eleven of the fourteen people 
they have helped.219 Securing spots in drug programs, sending daily text 
reminders to attend trial, and attaining the assurance of family members that they 
would be responsible for their loved one’s appearance are some examples of how 
these coalitions have secured pre-trial release for their clients.220 While these 
methods do not always work because judges fear the consequences of releasing 
defendants into the public without proper assurances, one person who avoids 
unnecessary detention is one more person who will not experience the negative 
effects of that detention which could be expansive.221 
Released individuals can maintain their daily routines for the days, months, 
or even years until trial, allowing them to keep their jobs and care for their 
children.222 Even more, the founder of the Bail Project urges that over the ten 
years she has been working on bail reform 96% of defendants have appeared for 
trial.223 Such figures should assuage concerns from supporters of bail who fear 
allowing defendants to rely on untraditional sources of bail will not hold them 
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accountable to the court .224 Furthermore, the argument that the possibility of 
getting one’s bail returned encourages appearances ignores the reality that most 
bailees do not receive their money back and often lose that money to the bail 
bondsmen regardless of whether they appear.225 
Critics are concerned that this reformed system of addressing bail cannot 
work in a state the size of California.226 They argue these programs would still be 
costly.227 However, even the Compton district attorney acknowledged that “the 
program is an encouraging step away from what has long been the status quo in 
L.A. County: If you have money, you bail yourself out; if you’re poor, you 
don’t.”228 For too long, the state of California has let the bail industry control the 
narrative surrounding pretrial defendants,229 and this is a chance to squash that 
narrative.230 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite the difficulties associated with relying on CBOs as the primary 
driver of change,231 the inclusion of legislation or judicial rules providing for the 
financial support of and cooperation with these groups by local law enforcement 
and other actors in the criminal justice system would reduce the disparity in bail 
outcomes.232 Ultimately, by funding community-based organizations through 
legislation and officially integrating them into the legal process whereby 
defendants secure release prior to trial, California can harness the energy and 
power of movements that already exist within the state and across the country to 
more effectively accomplish the goals that SB 10 sought to achieve.233 
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